Links between Indian and Greeks sceptics
First, I would like to state that I think there is a fine line between religions and philosophies. I would like to find an good umbrella term for this, but in the meantime i'll use 'beliefs' (or the longer form 'systems of beliefs').
Both religion and philosopy boil down to define what is good and what is bad, and, to be able to tell one from the other, most systems will ask you to look for the truth. Truth, in turn, lead philosophies and religions alike to look for knowledge (ultimate knowledge, omniscience). If not knowledge per se, at least, as the Bible puts it in Genesis, "knowledge of Good and Evil". Plato, for another example, says that the Form of Good is the aim of Knowledge, and from the Good thus known, objects get their usefulness and their value.
So here I was reading about the śramaṇa movements, the ascetic movements that steered away from the Vedic traditions in India, and which I had already read about. Among these sramana, Buddhism and Jainism are the most famous.
But there were others. Namely, Buddhism acknowledged the existence of six competing beliefs in its early days, six competitors that it tried to fight out (and mostly succeeded).
One of these systems of beliefs was the Ajñana of Sañjaya
Belaṭṭhiputta, the 'doubt' , or 'absence of knowledge' .
See, the premise is simple : some say such, with a lot of proof and logic and assertiveness, but some others say otherwise, with the same amount of proof and logic and assertiveness. One can then infer that one side of any debate (philosophical or religious) must be wrong, without being able to tell which is right. Hence, one cannot know what is true.
Not only one cannot ascend to (ultimate) knowledge, but as knowledge aims at telling Good from Evil, one of the side, noone knows which, is doing wrong without even knowing it. As a consequence, absolute knowledge is not only impossible to attain, but moreover imperfect or incomplete knowledge leads to evil and wrong.
And actually, if somebody, somewhere, had true omniscience, and he was the only True prophet or philosopher, he couldn't be differentiated from the other ones because no one would know that he is, nobody being omniscient but him.
Finally, Sceptics reminded the impossibility to know what's in others' minds, owing to the singularity of human experience, and hence the impossibility of participating in one another's omniscience, if it was at all possible, and they underlined the difficulty in reasoning from others' reasonings.
From all these reasons, they affirmed that it is best, most virtuous, to not know. To remain in a state of eternal un-knowledge.
This being said, and however violent buddhist commentators and jain gurus were against the Sceptics, they, the Sceptics, actually held to some knowledge.
For example, they knew that they didn't know. They also knew that it's evil to know ; which is a contradiction that was ridiculed at the time.
Moreover they knew that it's evil to do evil. That there's a good on one side and an evil on the other side, and that the two are mutually exclusive.
So eventually, being Sceptic was not being devoid of reflection, philosophy, or even devoid of a hold on anything. They were relatively uncognisant. In stark contrast to other systems of the time, they didn't pretend to nor look for omniscience.
But there was more to them.
They knew one thing, at least, in that they looked to not be in moral danger. Moral danger was the state of not doing what's right, which is, as I stated first, the basis of any philosophy or religion. Moral danger, to them, stems from bad (personal) feelings, like remorse, anger, or worry. Anguish, in a word. They looked, as others did, most famously the buddhists, to stay in moral tranquility, harmony, and un-change-ness.
Moral danger and anguish, according to different schools of sceptics, would come from one of these :
- being wrong in one's reasoning, owing to personal objectivity, or the "transcendental uniqueness of being". In a word, the fear, and rejection, of being wrong, lead them to wanting to not know. I might be wrong by feeling that i know, and there is no universal authority whatsoever lending credence or discredit to what i think i know, thus i don't want to hold anything for true.
- being 'entangled' by one's objectivity. I don't quite get the distinction between this one and the previous one, except it seems it relies on the meaning of 'entanglement' in Indian philosophy. But this school had moral grounds, more than logical grounds, for not holding anything as true knowledge.
- the third reason was that debate with people that pretended to omniscience would never lead to any agreement or mutual understanding. There, the position of being a sceptic, would in itself bear the impossibility of being right in a debate. The impossibility of convincing, debating, or being right while not holding to any absolute knowledge would only lead to frustration, moral defeat, and anguish. Basically, saying that you don't pretend to have the Truth makes you unable to debate with people who do.
- the fourth school of Sceptics was even more sceptical ; whereas all the previous reasons were aimed at attaining peace of mind, and good deeds through not doing evil, the fourth one was sceptical even of any good and evil. It argued : is their a possibility of knowing that there's a good and an evil ? Is there a possibility of being no good nor evil ? Failing to do so, they stated that even saying there's a moral high ground to begin with starts the process of anguish.
So where's the Greek in this ?
Well, as it happened, Alexander conquered all of the Achaemenid empire, and it meant also the then-Indian-leaning regions of today's Afghanistan and Pakistan that had been Indian territories conquered by the -Persian- Achaemenids. Alexander famously battled elephants in Punjab in 326 BCE.
There was a Greek painter along with the army, Pyrrho, who came back to Greece shortly afterwards and adopted an ascetic way of life upon his return. He professed that philosophy's aim was to reach a state of personal ataraxia, or absence of worry, much like the Indian religions and philosophies he had learned about, and that the way to attain ataraxia was to not believe in any belief. It is from him, and his followers, that the Greek scepticism was born.
From quotes of quotes of quotes, we kind of know that his beliefs were the following :
- one must lead a good life
- to lead a good life, questions are to be asked.
- these questions cannot be answered with absolute certainty (the various answers are without difference between one another, not measurable, and not decidable)
- the best possible way to live is hence to stay unenclined, undogmatic, and unwavering in the denial of beliefs
- in the absence of certainty, ataraxia must come from rejecting all dogmas and conclusions
He may as well have been influenced by older Greek philosophers. Plato quotes Socrates saying that he knew he was unknowing, and that it was the basis for his knowledge. The Eleatics of the Vth c. BCE had used logic to undermine the knowledge from perception, and dialectic to try and destroy their predecessors' philosophies.
Pyrrho held that perception, thought, and even reality, were indeterminate, unknowable, and could lead to the truth. He didn't write anything, though, and his philosophy was written by his pupil Timon, but we lost that too.
What can be said, however, is that his followers did not fully agree with him. Indeed, Pyrrho still held to some knowledge : he knew that perception, thought and reality were such and such. Not using the fourfold logic Indian Sceptics and Greeks after them had used, he didn't say that he couldn't know whether reality was or wasn't such and such. He held a negative dogma, but that was still a dogma.
Centuries later, in the 1st c. BCE, his teachings were revived by a school of scepticism in Alexandria. This school of Pyrrhonists held that one can't find truth through perception nor thought, and that the followers of any other philosophy is at the same time ignorant of truth and reality, but also ignorant of their own ignorance. It is a view that Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta could have said 500 years and 6000 km away.
More to the point, this school asserted that you must keep your judgment in suspension, or epoché, because of the lack of certainty in your perception and your thought process. They strove to stay above reproach or evil by determining nothing. They also held the moral high ground, since doubting themselves, they didn't conflict with themselves, whereas the others argued that some things were incognitive, being absolute, but argued so from there own cognition.
However, as you might have noted, holding that judgment is still a judgment in itself, by not doubting that you are right when you doubt.
This epoché had a lasting impact on philosophy, and actually the scientific method.
René Descartes, in the XVIIth c., doubted everything as a method : this is the Cartesian Doubt. He actually found two arguments to put in disbelief all of our perceptions and cognition (namely, that we are living in a dream, or that an Evil Demon is controlling our environment and we're living a lie). But this in turn led to the famous cogito, ergo sum. Since you are, you think, and since you think, you know that you are. This was his base for not doubting your existence, and hence starting the construction of knowledge.
This doubting everything in turn led the scientific method to advance hypotheses and predictions to be verified by proof, and not the other way around, that is advancing proofs to come consolidate a previously held, unproven knowledge.
Edmund Husserl, in his phenomenology, methodically blocked biases and assumptions to observe a phenomenon in and of itself (in phenomenology, everything is a phenomenon). Husserl's work influenced such big names as Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Derrida, the Pittsburgh School of Wilfrid Sellars...
But there I was reading all of this and I thought, man, this theory of scepticism smells like a lot of people would think today.
Let me first say that I'm not a sceptic. I accept the scientific method, and apply, you might have noticed, a lot of doubt in my own analytical approach of things. But I believe in holding some knowledge, maybe some axioms, a scale of values, maybe not ones set in stone, but allowing for structure and thoughts to be built upon them and refined, and corrected, over time.
But I found myself thinking of all the people who would rather shrug every theory rather than face the prospect of taking a side or holding to a belief. It's fashionable to doubt every belief, or to turn everything in a belief you have to doubt. Talk about politics and it's "all the same all over the place, the powerful want money and that's all there is to it". Talk about philosophy or merely values, and it's "I don't know, I don't understand, and I think it's not worth the effort". Say you have some faith, or some kind of faith, and you hear that "what's the point, we'll never know". Even science are objects to universal doubt : talk about the meteorological services, and "they don't know shit, they're always wrong". Talk about dietetics and it's "everyday the same and its contrary". Say you want to think and people answer "you're only hurting yourself, it's pointless because in the end, we're all clueless".
It is healthy, of course, to doubt. Not doubting anything is worse than doubting everything. But doubting everything leads you to holding on to nothing, and holding on to nothing leads to grab and grip indiscriminately to anything, after a time. That's why strong leaders are seducing to lost souls in times of social or personal stress. And it's true for societies as well as personalities.